Political parties can be key actors in the prevention and disruption of democratic erosion. Scholars have documented strategies political parties can implement to slow or reverse erosion. However, there is a dearth of guidance on which strategies are most effective, and the variation from one operating environment to another can undermine the application of this research in democracy and governance (DG) programming. To address this gap, the International Republican Institute (IRI) completed a literature review to investigate patterns of democratic erosion, the strategies political parties have used to oppose democratic erosion, and the factors that affect parties’ opportunities to implement these strategies.

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The burgeoning relationship between Chinese and Russian Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin is illustrated by China’s unprecedented support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and increased economic and military ties between the two countries. So far, China and Russia have followed different paths to their goal of weakening democratic institutions and bolstering autocratic governance worldwide. As their interests converge, countries around the world are beginning to experience the compounding effects of their influence efforts.

The Authoritarian Nexus: How Russia and China Undermine Democracy Worldwide is a compendium of nine country case studies, covering Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Sudan, Argentina, Chile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. The report examines how the corrosive actions of authoritarian actors overlap and complement one another and, assesses their impact on democratic norms and institutions. The case studies shed light on how powerful malign states try to influence the politics and governance of other nations to achieve favorable outcomes for their respective interests.

Each case is unique. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian troll farms are indirectly helped by China’s efforts to undermine information integrity. In Montenegro, China and Russia take advantage of deep divides in the population and the media to push their agendas. In North Macedonia, although the research did not find direct cooperation between China and Russia, the two countries rely on the same tactics to pressure local leadership. And in Serbia, the West’s disengagement has boosted Russia and China’s influence.

Both nations exploit weak governments and empower corruption, sometimes in order to make business deals, sometimes in order to influence a country’s politics. To address Argentina’s economic challenges some local leaders are eager to partner with China and Russia, including in ways that undermine rule of law and contribute to democratic backsliding. In neighboring Chile, Russia and China do not appear to be working together, though both countries disseminate anti-U.S. disinformation and propaganda.

In CAR, through mercenary groups like Wagner, Russia supports human rights abuses and instability in exchange for lucrative mineral and mining contracts. China funds projects that exacerbate corruption and environmental damage while disregarding human rights abuses. In Libya, foreign authoritarian states undermine Libya’s attempt to move toward peace and stability. Gulf states back armed groups and online groups who they believe will help further their own regional agendas. Russia funds foreign mercenaries, supports disinformation campaigns, and even printed money for a parallel government.

Download and read our latest report to learn more about how China and Russia are undermining democracy worldwide.

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To better inform its approach to youth empowerment and skills-building programs, IRI sought to identify obstacles to leadership development and advancement for Malaysian political party youth members. Specifically, the study sought to answer two primary questions:

1. To what extent are opportunities available to youth members aged 18-39 to obtain leadership experience or positions within their party?
2. What party practices, processes, rules, or traditions, if any, limit or make it difficult for youth members to obtain leadership experience or positions within their party?

Leadership development and advancement opportunities include, but are not limited to, training programs; mentorship; access to resources; participation in decision-making processes at the branch, division, state, or national level, electoral campaigns, annual general assemblies and internal party elections; and political appointments.

IRI collected data for this study between August 29 and October 12, 2023; an external consultant conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 38 individuals (13 women, 25 men) aged 18-41 from 12 political parties. Thirty-three individuals are registered, active, party youth members aged 18-39, and five are previous party youth members aged 40-41, who were selected for their perspectives as former members. The external consultant selected study participants through purposive sampling from a list of approximately 390 former IRI beneficiaries.

The study sample skews disproportionately male, Malay, and toward peninsular-based parties. Additional details about methodology, including participants’ party membership and other information, can be found in Appendix A. Study participants were recruited using the screening questionnaire in Appendix C. In line with qualitative research, the findings described in this report do not necessarily reflect the circumstances of all youth members in the political parties included in this study. Rather, the findings are reflective of the obstacles facing Malaysian political party youth. For purposes of the findings, IRI does not distinguish between the parties with age[1]defined youth wings – the vast majority – and the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA), which does not. For analysis of party constitutions, IRI uses the terms branch, division, and state to refer to the different, yet identical-in[1]meaning, names used by parties to identify specific administrative-geographic units.

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The launch of the BRI in 2013 unleashed a wave of infrastructure development funded principally by development banks owned by the PRC. Many BRI projects have addressed energy shortages, weak transportation networks, and poor water supply. But this surge in infrastructure development has come at a cost to the natural environment and has circumvented regulatory processes in host countries. Against this backdrop, the PRC began rebranding the BRI as a green Silk Road or green BRI as early as 2015. In years since, the PRC has signaled that it is attempting to address some of the root causes of environmental damage associated with the BRI. An example is PRC President Xi Jinping’s September 2021 announcement at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that China will no longer build coal power plants overseas. However, negative environmental impacts persist.

This report assesses the mismatch between the PRC’s green rhetoric and Chinese-financed development projects’ impact on the environment. The first section provides an overview of the CCP’s evolving environmental policy, regulations on PRC foreign direct investment, and corporate initiatives that address environmental-related reputational risks. The second section includes four case studies that are illustrative of the differences between PRC policy and practice. Case studies on infrastructure development in Central and Eastern Europe and among the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) expose the environmental impact of the BRI and how Chinese companies have sought to present themselves as environmentally responsible even when local civil society groups have exposed shortcomings and protested environmental damage. Examinations of the battery supply chain and renewable energy sector, and how they are often advanced via a close-knit relationship between PRC officials and local political elites, highlight the sometimes-damaging repercussions for local communities of investment in so-called clean energy.

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Kleptocrats and authoritarian nation-states are increasingly targeting transnational European institutions to buy influence and favors. Over the past decade, several national and transnational institutions in Europe have been scarred by numerous corruption scandals involving foreign countries and agents, which reveal dangerous kleptocratic in roads into its economic and political fabric.

Based on available case studies and interview with experts in Europe, this brief Fighting Strategic Corruption and Transnational Kleptocracy in Europe: Lessons Learned from Selected Cases identifies weak points in European institutional public integrity systems and architecture for combatting foreign influence and offers recommendations for policymakers in the European Union and National Governments.

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